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Cash Flows: Leadership PACs in the U. S. Congress from 1992-2008 
 
 
Suzanne M. Robbins 





The Republican leadership in the U.S. Congress 
pursued aggressive strategies of partisan discipline 
from 1994-2006, during which they held the majority 
of seats in the House of Representatives. Anecdotally, 
the Republican leadership built tight donor networks, 
demanding and rewarding partisan loyalty from rank 
and file elected officials. This paper uses Social 
Network Analysis to explore the structure of those 
relationships over time and compare them to the 
Democrats. Specifically, I examine campaign 
donations from and between leadership political action 





Political parties in the United States have never 
been considered ideologically cohesive, particularly 
when compared to other party systems [2][8][12]. The 
primary goal of every legislator is re-election; pursuing 
ideological goals do not further reelection as much as 
credit-claiming, advertising and position-taking [19]. 
American legislators create personal re-election 
constituencies to insulate themselves from party 
pressures [5][17]. Incumbents are particularly well-
suited to protecting themselves from partisan and 
electoral pressure [13]. Finally, office-seekers in the 
United States must organize and finance their own 
campaigns, largely independent of the political parties 
– leading to candidate-centered, rather than party-
centered campaigns [17]. Political parties are 
instrumental tools that ambitious politicians use to 
achieve goals related to re-election, gaining 
institutional power and affecting policy [1]. 
In effect, members of Congress face a collective 
action dilemma. To attain office and remain there, they 
must act as individuals. To achieve collective goals, 
they must form coalitions. While few mechanisms for 
party discipline exist, the promise of campaign funds, 
intra-party power and majority status can provide 
incentives for legislators to coordinate behavior. 
Campaign finance laws regarding political action 
committees (PACs) give politicians the opportunity to 
advance individual goals of re-election and intra-party 
power, as well as the collective goal of majority status, 
or control of the institution. In addition, the law allows 
elected officials to raise money outside their campaign 
organizations via “leadership PACs” to assist other 
candidates and organizations [21]. 
When the Republican party gained majority status 
with the 1994 election, its leadership used campaign 
finance laws and institutional rules to demand and 
reward partisan loyalty, especially under the leadership 
of Tom DeLay. While this analysis does not address 
questions of causality, it does explore and describe the 
changing structure of leadership PAC networks for 
both parties from 1992-2008. I find that the 
Republicans are first to establish connectivity among 
their leadership PACs, while Democrats tend to take 
advantage of the larger party structure to distribute 
campaign cash. Specifically, the Republicans created a 
core-periphery structure, while the Democrats 
developed a more balanced network. Finally, some 
evidence exists to confirm prior research on member 
PAC giving strategies with respect to individual and 
collective aspirations.  
 
2. Why give? 
 
Running for federal office is expensive. The high 
cost of elections and historical evidence of corruption 
led to the regulation of campaign finances in federal 
elections, including the U.S. House and Senate. Much 
of the law revolves around regulating contributions and 
expenditures and providing transparency through 
disclosure laws. Many organizations, including banks, 
corporations and labor unions, are prohibited from 
donating directly to campaigns; they are permitted to 
so via separate entities called political action 
committees (PACs). PACs must be funded separately 
from the general treasury through voluntary 
contributions. Finally, PACs are limited in the amount 
 
they can spend on candidates, political parties, and one 
another [9][21]. 
Leadership (or member) PACs are a subset of 
political action committees, governed by the same 
campaign finance laws governing traditional PACs. 
Instead of being affiliated with business, labor or civic 
organizations, elected officials (and former ones) 
create and chair these committees, which are legally 
distinct entities from their respective campaign 
committees and the political parties. The widespread 
use of leadership PACs is a relatively recent 
institutional development [16][26]. Since the early 
1990s, the number of member PACs exploded, 
reaching 458 in 2008 (Figure 1). Republican officials 
led the way in creating these committees, consistently 
outpacing Democratic politicians.  
Member PACs may distribute their wealth to 
many different types of organizations, not just 
candidates. In fact, a committee could make a direct 
contribution to a candidate (up to $10,000 per two-year 
electoral cycle), to the national party (up to $30,000 
per cycle), the state party ($5000) and any other PACs 
($5000 each, annually), on top of what the candidate 
committee can contribute [21]. Leadership PACs 
provide a way for redistributing fundraising wealth 
from safe, well-funded legislators to challengers and 
competitive races [10][11][25]. 
Academic research on PACs spending and 
influence is divided on the actual purpose of cash and 
its influence on policy outcomes; most ascertain that 
contributions either buy policy influence or political 
access, with about half the literature concluding 
contributions have no direct influence [3][18]. 
Influence or access may not be a direct goal of a PAC 
contribution. More accurately, a PAC contribution 
helps maintain (re-elect) or expand (support 
challengers) a favorable coalition of legislators with 
similar policy preferences. Prior research suggests that 
leadership PACs are strategic, supporting quality 
challengers and vulnerable incumbents. Members 
owning these PACs may have both collective and 
individual goals in mind when distributing funds 
[11][25].  
The primary goal of all members of Congress is 
reelection, followed by power within the institution 
and good public policy; they are able achieve these 
goals through credit-claiming, advertising and 
position-taking [19] and taking advantage of the perks 
of in being office to establish a personal, as opposed to 
partisan, connection with their voters [5][13]. 
Achieving stature within the institution, such as 
advancing in the leadership or committee structures of 
Congress can advance these goals. In addition, 
legislators build alliances to pass legislation that helps 
their individual districts. Thus, members of Congress 
contribute from their leadership PACs to improve their 
individual standing within their respective party and 
within the chamber as a whole. In doing so, they 
enhance individual electoral prospects. Legislators 
desiring advancement should contribute to the party 
leaders who then redistribute funds to the races where 
most needed. Members who want to build alliances 
will be more likely to contribute to other member 
PACs, regardless of the rank of the member. While the 
leadership PAC retains direct control when donating to 
a candidate, it looks magnanimous and expansive when 
it donates to the other entities. 
Collective goals, such as achieving majority 
control and passing programmatic legislation, require 
coordination among individuals. Parties evolved within 
the Congress to maintain more or less permanent 
coalitions of individuals who share similar preferences. 
One way for a party to improve cohesion is to elect 
more politicians who share party objectives. More 
specifically, prior research argues that party leaders 
tend to sponsor the largest committees, play a role in 
targeting races and exhorting their members to do the 
same [26]. The leadership of each party may use 
leadership PACs to enforce party discipline, forge 
coalitions and reward good behavior. Thus, collective 
goals of the parties would include maintenance, 
expansion, and party-building. Thus, we would expect 
party leadership to contribute their funds to targeted 
races that would help maintain or gain control and to 
serve as brokers, connecting those with funds to those 
in need. 
Individual goals are intertwined with collective 
goals of majority power and control of the chamber. 
Majority status confers additional perks including 
setting the agenda and committee chairmanships both 
of which can be tailored to fit constituent needs and 
achieve policy goals [13]. Simply, majority status, a 
collective goal, helps politicians achieve individual 
goals related to advancement. 
Campaign finance law, together with collective 
and individual needs of legislators, creates the 
Figure 1. Leadership PAC growth 
possibility for networks to develop, reflecting the flow 
of resources from one fundraiser to another. Naturally, 
some members can afford to be expansive – or 
generous – particularly those with safe seats, national 
reputations, or existing leadership status. Others will 
endeavor to create funding ties with one another in 
support of future legislative or electoral goals, such as 
presidential ambitions. The party organizations 
themselves will likely serve as conduits, redistributing 
funds where needed.  
 
3. Methods and data 
 
Elected officials own leadership PACs. They have 
control over the funds raised and distributed. While 
they may be pressured from the legally separate 
political party organizations (i.e., the Republican or 
Democratic National Committees), financial decisions 
remain within the member PAC, not the party. Elected 
officials use leadership PACs to raise money separate 
from their campaign committees; successful 
fundraising may raise a member’s prestige or status, 
help increase a party’s seat share, and could be used 
enforce party discipline. However, contributions do not 
always flow from a member committee directly to a 
candidate. A member PAC may give to another 
leadership PAC or another political organization, 
including parties, ideological PACs and business-
related PACs, who may then be in a position to 
redistribute the funds. 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) allows one to 
examine the relationships between actors. SNA enables 
one to uncover who the prominent actors may be, how 
entities are connected with one another and relative 
power within a particular context. Moreover, SNA also 
allows one to understand the structure of those 
relationships – or the overall context of the 
relationships. Campaign contributions are a classic 
form of transaction relation, where the cash from one 
member to another constitutes a valued, directed tie. In 
addition, the contribution also communicates 
information about both the giver and the receiver. 
Thus, SNA is an appropriate technique to understand 
the structure of giving within leadership PACs in 
Congress and can improve our understanding of 
relationships in Congress, as they are explicitly 
modeled. Here, I make use of the valued and directed 
properties that contributions inherently communicate.  
Federal elections for the House and Senate are 
governed by a two-year cycle corresponding to the 
elections that occur for Congress. Thus, the election 
occurring in 1992 would include the year prior as part 
of its cycle (e.g., 1991-92 is the 1992 cycle). I examine 
leadership PAC contribution patterns for each cycle 
from 1992-2008, or nine cycles. The total cash 
contributions from one member PAC to another PAC 
in a single two-year cycle creates the tie for a single 
election; the combination of those ties between the 
varying member PACs creates the network for that 
cycle. I use the total dollar amount from one committee 
to another in a cycle rather than the number of 
contributions to weight the edges, under the 
assumption that receiving more money is more 
important and constitutes a stronger relationship. The 
ties are directed, indicated that the donor chose the 
recipient, which has meaning in terms of collective and 
individual goals.  
Leadership PACs give almost exclusively to 
fellow partisans. Thus, each party is examined 
independently. Moreover, the networks do not 
necessarily contain the same set of actors over time, 
reflecting electoral fortunes of politicians, this makes 
true dynamic modeling problematic [22][23]. The data 
come from the Center for Responsive Politics’ bulk or 
“open data” for PAC to PAC contributions [7]. I first 
examine within-member PAC giving. I then examine 
leadership PAC giving to other political action 
committees and the national, state and local parties.  
 
4. Sharing the cash among themselves 
 
How do leadership PACs share funds with each 
other? Examining within-leadership committee 
contributions can illustrate the structure of 
relationships, including who, if anyone is influential, 
and how well the leadership PACs are connected. 
Having a leadership PACs may signify a desire for 
higher office, staying an incumbent, or passage of 
policy priorities – individualistic goals related to 
advancement. Sharing hard earned cash from your 
leadership committee, or developing exchange 
relationships with other leadership committees, 
requires overcoming the collective action problem. 
Individuals must move beyond individualist aims to 
advance collective goals of majority status. Thus, 
members may pursue goals of advancement and 
alliances, but may also pursue maintenance, expansion 
and party-building activity. The network of within-
member PAC giving can highlight these relationships, 
particularly those of advancement.  
In this section, I examine the digraphs from 1992 
to 2008 for both partys’ Congressional leadership 
PACs. Circles indicate House members, squares 
indicate Senators. The sizes of the nodes indicate 
betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is 
important in the context of PAC giving, as 
betweenness allows one to assess the location of actors 
and their roles. An actor with high betweenness 
centrality has more influence over the flow of money 
in the network, connecting disparate elements of the 
network [15]. I use spring-embedding with geodesic 
distances to configure the digraphs. In the figures 
below, I do not show the edge weights to improve 
readability. Interestingly, neither party exhibits much 
in the way of ties or structure early. The most 
connected networks occur for the Republicans in the 
early 2000s, at the height of Republican fundraising 
prowess.  
 
4.1. Democrats and presidential ambition 
 
The Democratic leadership PACs networks are 
slow to organize. The first four networks (92, 94, 96, 
98) average 2.5 actors and 1.5 ties; no exchanges take 
place in 1994. The last four cycles (02, 04, 06, 08) 
average 32 actors and 26.5 ties. The networks are 
small, to be sure, but much more developed in more 
recent electoral cycles.  
Not until the 2004 election does any real connectivity 
occur within the Democratic committee network 
(Figure 2). This network consists of both House and 
Senate member PACs, with Tom Daschle, Nancy 
Pelosi and Patrick Kennedy anchoring a small, simple 
network. Interestingly, the direction of ties suggests 
that House members are assisting Senators in 2004. 
Daschle, the highest ranking Democrat in the Senate 
has an equal number of ties in either direction. This 
would be consistent with the idea that party leaders 
funnel money to those most in electoral need or with 
collective goals of attaining or protecting majority 
status.  
In 2002, Representative Pelosi served as Minority 
Leader, or leader of the opposition party in the House 
(then Democratic). In that cycle, she contributes to 
other House members with relative safe seats, potential 
evidence of alliance-building, individual goals. 
However, since this network only consists of other 
incumbents with leadership PACs, I cannot rule out 
party building. Pelosi’s presence from 2002-2006 
presage her rise to leadership within House Democratic 
ranks; she won the Speakership, the highest office with 
the House, in 2007. More often than not, she is 
distributing, contributions consistent with ambition. 
In 2008, two of the three actors with the most 
betweenness centrality are Senators with presidential 
aspirations (Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden). In 
addition, both contenders for the Democratic 
Presidential nomination are recipients, not donors. The 
ties related to presidential hopefuls indicate a different 
type of strategy than discussed above, suggesting more 
theorizing about inter-institutional ambition. For 
example, if a legislator wanted to run for higher office, 
such as the presidency, then she would want to build a 
coalition of support prior to doing so. Giving money to 
colleagues, or being expansionist for some time prior 
to a presidential bid, would build support for this 
ambition that could be called upon during the election. 
This is not evident in any of the within member PAC 
networks for Senator Hillary Clinton. In all cases, she 
attracts contributions from her fellow members, 
suggesting support for her potential bid already exists. 
It is also evidence of her ability to raise funds even as a 
newcomer to the Senate. By 2003 she had already 
surpassed President Bill Clinton as the Democratic 
Party’s leading fundraiser [6]. Giving to prominent 
presidential hopefuls might be considered the ultimate 
in party-building behavior: it helps capture a different 
institution for the party.  
 
4.2. Republicans coordinate, then collapse 
 
The Republicans are much quicker to begin the 
flow of money across leadership PACs and exhibit 
much more cohesiveness in the digraphs. Prior to 2000, 
the Republican graphs are quite similar to the 
Democrats, though larger: from 1992-1998, each 
network averages 8.75 actors and 5.75 ties. This period 
coincides with the Republicans gaining control of both 
Figure 2. Democratic leadership PACs 2004 Figure 3. Republican leadership PACs 2002 
chambers of the U.S. Congress, and attempting to 
maintain party discipline (1995-98). The networks for 
the last four electoral cycles are much larger than prior 
periods or than any of the Democratic networks, 
averaging 85.75 actors and 118.75 ties from 2002-
2008.  
Like the Democrats, the early cycles consist 
mainly of small, disconnected groups. It is not until 
2000 that any connectivity between separate 
components of these early networks appears. In 
addition, the Republican leadership PAC network is at 
its height only from 2000-2006. The member PAC 
network exhibits fragmentation in 2006, which is much 
more apparent in 2008. In 2008, when the Republicans 
no longer controlled either the House or the Senate, the 
size of their network was nearly half what it was in 
2006, with a third the number of ties. This could reflect 
any number of things: the loss seats, and consequent 
loss of majority, the splintering of relationships within 
the Republican Party, or a change of financial strategy 
within the leadership.  
The Republican network for 2002 reveals 
interesting patterns (Figure 3). Two former legislators 
have high betweenness centrality (Livingston and 
Paxon). This gives them positional advantage, in that 
they can help resources flow from one part of the 
network to another. Former members often maintain 
their Leadership PACs for some time after leaving 
office. As neither individual has individual electoral or 
advancement ambitions within Congress, they are 
clearly pursuing collective goals, including expansion 
and party-building. In particular, Livingston could 
afford to be expansionist: he retired in early 1999.  
The 2006 electoral cycle, which cost the 
Republicans majority status in both chambers, reveals 
the beginning of what appears to be separation by 
chamber (Figure 4), Senators McConnell and Stevens 
anchor the Senate side, while Representative Blunt 
exhibits the highest betweenness centrality on the 
House (left) side. This would indicate the possibility 
that these legislators were engaging in party-building 
and a rear guard strategy – to protect majority status 
within each chamber. However, rather than 
coordinating across chambers as in the past, the giving 
within leadership PACs is more within chamber, 
perhaps to serve collective goals of maintaining 
control.  
Evidence for both collective and individual goals 
is present. Neither McConnell nor Stevens was up for 
re-election, thus could afford to be generous. For most 
of the electoral cycle, the Republicans were expected 
to maintain control of the Senate. McConnell would 
have benefited as he was expected to become the 
leader of the Senate had that happened. Nearly all of 
his ties are as contributor, which would lend support to 
both individual and collective strategies as winning the 
majority would serve advancement well. As an 
established leader, he would know which races to 
target to keep that majority. Roy Blunt exemplifies 
collective pursuits, as he stepped down from his 
leadership post in early 2006. Regardless, he exhibits 
the highest betweenness centrality within the House. In 
this case, while he does take in contributions, he 
primarily distributed funds to other leadership PACs. 
Another significant node, Oxley, also lends itself to 
collective goals, as Oxley did not run for re-election in 
2006. All of Oxley’s ties are as a giver, thus playing an 
expansionist role, attempting to keep the Republicans 
in power on the House side. 
The 2008 Republican Leadership PAC network 
shows fragmentation (Figure 5), with several distinct 
components, consisting primarily of dyads or triads. 
The two largest components generally reflect the two 
chambers, House and Senate. McConnell and Lott play 
a role in linking various actors on the Senate 
component (right side, figure 5). On the House side, 
the primary players appear to be Tom Feeney and Eric 
Cantor. Feeney was defeated in his re-election bid; the 
Democratic Party campaigned heavily to defeat him. 
Closer inspection of the digraph reveals that he is 
prominent: his leadership PAC was primarily a 
recipient from his colleagues, who presumably were 
Figure 4. Republican leadership PACs 2006 Figure 5. Republican leadership PACs 2008 
trying to save his election. On the other hand, Cantor is 
expansive, giving to other candidates, either for 
individual goals (advancement) or to regain majority 
status. In this case, he is an example of someone who 
would benefit from pursuing both individual goals 
(advancement within the leadership structure) and 
collective goals (achieving majority status). If the 
Republicans had regained control of the House of 
Representatives, his leadership position, he gained 
immediately following the election would be much 
more consequential. 
 
5. Cash flows to other organizations 
 
Leadership PACs also donate to the national, state 
and local parties, the campaign arms of the two parties 
within Congress as well as other PACs (ideological 
and business). A very successful fundraiser can 
redistribute his or her success to a colleague, the 
parties or other organizations. Giving to other party 
committees can be an indicator of both individual and 
collective goals. Presumably, giving to your own state 
party committee enhances your re-election effort; 
giving more generously across multiple states and 
organizations may indicate national aspirations; and 
giving to the national parties may be indicative of both 
types of goals.  
This section examines the full population of 
leadership committees giving to other political 
committees in 1992, 2000 and 2008. Many member 
PACs do not contribute to one another but do form 
financial ties with political parties and other 
organizations. The networks from the previous section 
are embedded in these networks. Leadership PACs are 
indicated with triangles, party organizations with 
diamonds, and all other PACs with circles. Again, I use 
spring-embedding to visualize the six networks. Node 
size is set to betweenness centrality in order to better 
evaluate a member PAC’s role in the network with 
respect to the flow of money. I first discuss and 
compare the structure of the networks as a whole 
before turning to a discussion of individual roles within 
that structure. 
 
5.1. Leadership PAC giving over time 
 
Several interesting trends are apparent. More 
leadership PACs form relationships over time with 
other PACs. The Democratic leadership PAC network 
consists of 43 actors/ 48 ties in 1992 and 223 
actors/501 ties in 2008.  The Republican member PAC 
network is similar, ranging from 52 actors/43 ties to 
Figure 6. DLP PAC giving 1992 Figure 7. RLP PAC giving 1992 
Figure 8. DLP PAC giving 2000 Figure 9. RLP PAC giving 2000 
402 nodes/644 ties for the same years.  Democratic 
member PACs link to political organizations earlier 
than Republicans, creating a balanced network over 
time. The Republicans approximate a core-periphery 
structure.  
In 1992, the central players for both Republicans 
and Democrats are established leaders within 
Congress, who primarily distribute funds to other 
PACs (Figures 6 and 7). The Democratic leadership 
link to their political party organizations through 
donations to them, acting expansively. Thus, leaders 
within the Democratic Party are sharing their largesse 
with organizations that can better target races. This is 
reflective of a maintaining or an expansion strategy, or 
strategies to keep or attain majority. The Republican 
leadership network also appears to be acting 
expansively, consistent with collective goals. However, 
the 1992 Republican network is sparse, consisting of 
several small components; two of these are of star 
configurations consisting solely of donations to other 
committees. 
The pattern of coordinating with the party 
organizations becomes much more evident in 2000 and 
2008 for both parties (Figures 8-11). In addition, the 
graphs for both parties clearly show more actors, 
reflecting the increased use of leadership PACs more 
generally (Figure 1). Finally, the Democratic 
leadership networks appear to exhibit more 
connectivity or coordination in both 2000 and 2008 
(Figures 8 and 10) than their Republican counterparts 
(Figures 9 and 11). The Republican leadership 
networks give the impression of multiple core-
periphery structures, particularly in 2008, which may 
be consistent with hierarchical leadership. It may also 
indicate that this network is more fragile, especially if 
one of the more central players retires.  The 
Republicans appear to have a small number of key 
actors who control the flow of money, which would be 
consistent with collective goals of majority-building 
and party discipline within the institution.  The 
Democratic network has more channels for the money 
to flow perhaps allowing for ambition. 
Some basic network statistics for the overall 
networks are presented in Table 1. All six networks are 
sparse, as measured by network density. Network 
density is simply the proportion of all possible ties that 
are actually present.  While there are far more actors 
present in these networks and over time, legislators are 
very selective in whom they choose for a contribution.  
While the Democratic member PACs consistently 
make more ties within their network, the largest 
percentage of ties they make is in 1992, at 2.6% of 
possible links. This does suggests that leadership PACs 
use donations strategically, as they do not appear to 
make indiscriminant connections. 
Table 1. Network density and centralization 
  1992 2000 2008 
  R D R D R D 
Out-
degree  .443 .241 .203 .192 .194 .153 
In-degree  .024 .143 .139 .117 .186 .189 
Density .016 .026 .007 .013 .004 .010 
Nodes  52 43 188 109 402 223 
Ties 43 48 230 164 644 501 
Measures of network centralization provide insight 
into the overall structure of each network and allows 
for comparison across networks. A highly centralized 
network is dominated by a few actors, which could 
easily fragment into unconnected subgroups; less 
centralized networks are much more resilient. Here, I 
use Freeman’s approach to calculate both in-degree 
and out-degree centralization for directed ties. In 
addition, I dichotomized the values to ease 
interpretation; scores can be expressed as percentages. 
Centralization scores indicate the degree of asymmetry 
in contributions. High in-degree centralization would 
indicate that a small number of actors receive 
contributions (either to save their election or to re-
Figure 10. DLP PAC giving 2008 Figure 11. RLP PAC giving 2008 
distribute). A high out-degree score would indicate that 
a small number of actors distribute funds or control the 
flow of money. 
First, out-degree centralization, which is higher for 
the Republican leadership networks, decreases for both 
parties. It is an indicator of the increased use of 
member PACs by more actors in attempting to affect 
outcomes. It could also be an indicator of individual 
goals by building a loyal base among members, 
circumventing the parties. The change over time is 
most dramatic for the Republicans, moving from 44% 
in 1992 to half that amount in 2008. The Democratic 
networks also decline from 24% to 15%.  In both 
cases, the out-degree scores indicate much more stable 
networks, less likely to completely fragment, but also 
that a fair amount of autonomy  occurs within the 
networks by 2008 in terms of giving cash, consistent 
with individual goals. 
All the networks have lower in-degree 
centralization scores, with the exception of the 
Democrats in 2008, whose in-degree score is 3.6% 
higher than the out-degree score for 2008, and 7.24% 
greater than the in-degree score in 2000. This could 
reflect increased fundraising prowess over time from 
the Democratic leadership network once the Democrats 
regained control of both the House and Senate in 2007. 
The Republican leadership network increases from 
2.35% in 13.86% in 2000 and 18.6% in 2008. In all 
cases, for both parties, a greater number of PACs are 
recipients over time. 
 
5. 2.Centrality and reach  
 
Measures of centrality are useful for assessing 
important actors are relative to one another. Degree 
centrality scores in directed networks provide 
information about how prominent, prestigious or 
expansive that actor is. Betweenness centrality scores 
are used to assess an actor’s location in the network 
and control over the flow of resources [15][24]. High 
in-degree centrality signifies that the individual is 
prestigious, or a recipient of donations. This could be 
because that actor is in trouble electorally, or in a 
position to redistribute funds to other individuals in 
need. High out-degree centrality indicates 
expansiveness, or individuals who are generous with 
their cash flow. Finally, high betweenness suggests that 
that actor is important to connecting various parts of 
the network and insuring that resources flow. 
Table 2 presents information on who gives and 
receives for 2000 and 2008. Two types of centrality are 
presented: degree and betweenness (normalized, using 
Freeman’s approach). For both parties, the most 
prominent recipients are the campaign arms of each 
chamber. These campaign organizations, headed up by 
rising stars in each chamber, indicate fundraising 
prowess in terms of acquiring cash. This is consistent 
with attracting funds to target important races, hence to 
support collective goals. Members give to these 
organizations as they can make the best strategic use of 
the contribution.  
Not surprisingly, the actors with the highest 
Table 2. Normalized Freeman degree and betweeness centrality for selected observations 
     Republicans 2000 2008 
Indegree National Rep. Congressional Cmte. 14.44 National Rep. Congressional Cmte. 18.95 
 National Rep. Senatorial Cmte. 6.42 National Rep. Senatorial Cmte. 10.72 
Outdegree Americans for Rep. Majority (DeLay) 20.88 Freedom Fund (Crapo) 19.70 
 New Republican Majority Fund (Lott) 1.26 Freedom Project (Boehner) 17.21 
Betweenness Americans for  Rep. Majority (DeLay) 0.111 Freedom Project (Boehner) 0.201 
 Bayou Leader PAC (Tauzin) 0.076 Growth & Prosperity (Bachus) 0.050 
Democrats  2000 2008   
Indegree  Dem. Congressional Campaign Cmte. 12.96 Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte. 19.82 
 Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte. 12.04 Dem. Cong. Campaign Cmte. 18.02 
 Democratic National Committee 10.19   
Outdegree   District 20 FL (Deutsch) 20.37 AmeriPAC (Hoyer) 16.22 
 PAC for a Change (Boxer) 16.67 HILLPAC (Clinton) 11.71 
 DASHPAC (Daschle) 10.19 Searchlight Leadership Fund (Reid) 9.46 
 Leadership of Today & Tomorrow 
(Becerra) 
10.19 National Leadership (Rangel) 9.01 
Betweenness  PAC for a Change (Boxer) 0.151 HILLPAC (Clinton) 0.452 
 
America Works (S. Brown) 0.043 BRIDGE PAC (Clyburn) 0.112 
      Unite Our States (Biden) 0.09 
 
centrality (out-degree or betweenness) are generally 
those already in a position of power with Congress and 
not vulnerable electorally. They can afford generosity 
– expansiveness. They can also target races to achieve 
the collective goals of party discipline (reward 
loyalists) and party building.  Crapo at first appears 
odd, until one recognizes that he never faces a real 
challenge to re-election in Idaho. As a safe incumbent, 
he is free to pursue collective goals along with the 
party leaders and former leaders (Lott) though 
individual ambition cannot be ruled out.  
Regarding ambition, some interest points are 
relevant for the Democrats. The most expansive 
legislator in 2000 is Peter Deutsch (FL), who often ran 
unopposed for re-election. He did have ambition for 
higher office, running for the Democratic nomination 
for Senate unsuccessfully in 2004. Interestingly, 
Clinton’s committee has both high out-degree 
centrality in the 2008 cycle and betweenness centrality, 
reflecting both her fundraising prowess and her 
presidential ambitions. Whereas she was a recipient in 
the member-PAC only network, here she also has 
donor propensity, particularly to state party 
organizations. 
To further understanding of leadership PAC 
giving, I studied the ego networks, or neighborhoods, 
of several key member PACs. I focused on the out-
neighborhoods – or all the ties from an ego, or focal 
member PAC, to others political organizations, their 
alters. The focus of the analysis is on the 2008 data 
presented in Table 3 and the concept of reach. 
The concept of reach speaks to the ability of the 
ego to connect to the entire network. This is yet 
another way to think about the influence of key 
players. Specifically, two-step reach, or the percentage 
of all actors in the entire network the ego can reach in 
“two-steps”, for our top leadership PACs shows some 
variance among the egos. Despite the fact that several 
of our leader PACs involve party leaders and 
presidential aspirants, only two house Democrats 
(Hoyer and Rangel) and one house Republican 
(Boehner) can reach a majority of the actors in their 
networks. This is can be thought of as the ability of the 
contribution to have a trickle down affect, as someone 
like Hoyer can reach 60% of the network through a 
“friend of a friend”, while others, such as McConnell 
can only reach 17% of the Republican network in this 
manner. In 2008, then, some Democratic leaders were 
better able to serve the entire network than the 
Republicans. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The rational choice perspective of individual goal 
directed behavior fits American political behavior well. 
Over time, legislators created institutions to overcome 
the inherent collective action problems prevalent in our 
legislative and electoral systems. But even these 
institutions, such as political parties, must overcome 
the candidate-centered nature of federal elections. The 
campaign finance system provides an additional 
institutional mechanism – leadership PACs – that can 
help achieve both individual and collective goals. 
Members can be expansive or generous and 
simultaneously achieve goals of re-election, 
advancement and party building. 
From this study, several things are clear. First, 
when studying the within-member PAC networks, the 
Republicans were faster to organize and share cash 
with one another. Within-PAC giving could highlight 
individual goals, particularly those of advancement and 
alliance building. Second, when examining the larger 
context of leadership PAC to PAC giving, the 
Democrats make more use of their extant party 
structure, coordinating with them earlier and more 
often than the Republicans. This would have the effect 
of strengthening the party structure over time. 
Some confirmatory evidence for contribution 
strategies exists. Individuals with safe seats, not 
running or who have retired appear to be expansionist, 
consistent with collective, party-building goals. 
Members in party leadership positions within 
Congress, having already achieved advancement, 
follow strategies to maintain or expand the coalition. 
While it is impossible to distinguish individual and 
collective strategies for other members in this data, it is 
possible that they are pursuing both simultaneously. 
Last, while advancement strategies would suggest that 
individuals would give more to colleagues [10], this is 
not the case when it comes to Clinton. Most of her 
donations went to garner support in among the rank 
and file, laying the grounds for a primary run, 
Table 3. Selected "neighborhoods", 2008 
 
Size Density 2 Reach h 
Crapo (R, Senate) 79 0.00 32.42 
Boehner (R, House) 69 0.04 49.63 
Hoyer (D, House) 36 0.00 60.81 
Clinton (D, Senate) 26 0.00 47.3 
Rangel (D, House) 20 3.16 51.8 
McConnell (R, Senate) 15 4.29 16.71 
Bachus (R, House) 15 3.33 41.15 
Nadler (D, House) 15 3.33 34.23 
Lott (R, Senate) 12 3.79 34.16 
 
suggesting a different strategy when it comes to 
winning a different institution 
This exploratory analysis does not test the 
hypotheses posed about behavior, as it only examines 
cash flows from leadership PACs to one another and to 
other PACs, not candidates. However, studying the 
network of financial ties is a first step in evaluating the 
structure Congressional relationships. If structure in the 
social network perspective is viewed as enduring 
patterns of relations, then simple cross-sectional 
analyses of dynamic processes miss the evolution or 
changes within the context of decision-making. 
Network analysis is useful here in elucidating the 
endogenous nature of campaign finance. Another 
benefit of network analysis over most statistical 
methods is that actors are explicitly modeled as 
interdependent. Future research must disentangle 
whether politicians create the network, or if the 
network determines their behavior. Any quantitative 
analysis must take into account the embedded nature of 
the observations when conducting hypothesis testing 
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